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I. 
As Hegel already wrote in his Asthetik, drama appears to the philosophers 
as "the most perfect of the arts," because it combines "the objectivity of epos and 
the subjective principle of lyrical poetry [. . J in the immediate presence of 
action."1 This action comes "from inside the character" (and so it must have a 
psychological nature); but the audience can only see it from outside, "on the 
ground of the substantial nature of the aims, individuals, and engagements," that 
is, as an appearance. But for Hegel, the written drama, that is, the literary aspect 
of theatre, is not enough: "For the work of art to come to life," it requires "the 
complete scenic performance." Only in this way, we can see "the exterior side 
of the place, of the milieu, but also of doing and happening." This exteriority is 
the very peculiarity of the entire theatrical event, and it is possible only on stage, 
not on the written page. Because of this special irreducible exteriority, the 
artistic event we call theatre appears to be "the most perfect" from the perspective 
of the philosophical tradition "coming from Kant," which is interested not only 
in "an analytical work about truth" but also in "the other critical tradition" which 
"asks itself: what is our moment? What is our field of possible experience?" and 
tries to build "an ontology of the moment, and ontology of ourselves."2 
Theatre interests such a philosophy because of the apparent opposition 
between two principles. First, theatre's "sensible matter,"3 that is, "the speech," 
or, generally speaking, the very actual human presence, "is the only element 
worthy of the exposition of the spirit." Thus, theatre seems to be destined 
towards a strong integration with its object; human life represents human life, 
sentiments signify sentiments, actions and words indicate actions and words. This 
fact seems to warrant a special truth. Secondly, this "spirit," or in a more 
empirical way, human life, is "exposed" by theatre only from outside. We can 
perceive the behaviour and the speech of characters, but not their thoughts, 
sentiments, or intentions unless they choose to tell us by articulating them to 
another character or using the technique of a parte. But we cannot tell if they 
are being honest. A character may also be mistaken about its feelings or change 
its mind. In theatre (different from what happens in the novel or in poetry), the 
characters are opaque to us. Theatre is the art par excellence of the "real 
presence" of the human being, but this presence is an exteriority* 
This is an important limit of the theatre, as opposite to the omniscience of 
the narrator of the novel, or the interiority of the lyrical poet, and even to the 
psychological truth of music. What is philosophically interesting in this limit? 
This limit of exteriority is precisely the limit of the "ontology of our field of 
possible experience." The experience of human life, even of our own lives, is 
always more or less external; nevertheless, it makes sense to us. To exist means 
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literally to stay outside. The so-called "continental philosophy of this century 
(from Heidegger to Levinas) understands that we are "beings of distance" 
characterized by a condition of "exile," "alterity," and "exteriority." Different arts 
have tried to represent this situation, but theatre has embodied it in its structure. 
n. 
Not all contemporary theatre knows the truth of this limit nor dares practice 
it. Showing the groundless exteriority of the theatre (and the groundless 
exteriority of humankind) is always dangerous. It seems simpler and more 
reassuring for theatre's authors and interpreters to rely on conventional wisdom, 
to pretend that theatre can present "the real inner life" of its characters. 
Contemporary theatre is important when it dares build a theory of action, image, 
and fantasy as external life, Tadeusz Kantor's theatre is one of the most radical 
efforts in this direction, as Pirandello's, Beckett's, and Grotowski's theatrical 
works were in very different ways. 
Kantor was conscious of the relevance of his theatre. When he spoke of the 
"theatre of death" and compared his actors to corpses, when he combined theatre 
and photography, when he spoke about his "room of memory" as the source of 
his scenic images, when he explained his characters as ghosts from a subjective 
past, he was always thinking about theatre not as a tool to penetrate the 
"psychological life" of his characters. On the contrary, Kantor described the 
scene as a projection of flat images, coming out of a memory not represented, 
acting only as a "limit of the word."5 
Kantor not only spoke about this concept, but he realized it in his theatre 
using a number of different, though similar, devices. I will identify some of them 
in this essay. The first, and most evident, is the use of his own person, the 
presence of the author on stage. His figure, dressed in black, moving among the 
actors was impressive and innovative. Kantor did not participate in the action on 
stage. He was a spectator, a member of the audience as it were. He was a 
spectator in the "sacred space" of the action, although at a different level of 
reality. He functioned as a bridge between the world of the performance and the 
world of "reality." For example, he conducted the rhythm of his actors as a 
music director conducts his orchestra. The presence of Kantor on stage deserves 
theoretical attention. It was not the "empirical author" Tadeusz Kantor, but rather 
it was his appearance, or him "quoting" himself, that hovered around the stage. 
Thus, it was "uttered" in the text of the performance, though it did not belong to 
the order of a representational practice. It was the "enunciated enunciation" of 
the performance, in the same way as the narrator using the first person (and not 
the empirical author, Marcel Proust) is the protagonist of A la recherche du temps 
perdu. On stage, even though Kantor was the "I," what the audience was able 
to see was Kantor's exteriority, the "I" spoken, not the "I" speaking. But, of 
course, on stage, the two aspects of himself, the speaking and the spoken, could 
not be divided. Kantor was the real author of the performance, and also the 
author of this aspect of the performance that generated the presence and the 
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appearance of "the author." But the audience could only see the visible author, 
his allusions to and quoting of himself. As usual, Kantor was well aware of this 
metaphysical conflict. He wished to complicate it further presenting in Today Is 
My Birthday an actor who functioned as his double. This work was performed 
after Kantor's death, and the double functioned not as a counterfeit of the visible 
author, but as a sign of his absence. 
Inside the performance, Kantor acted as a witness. He watched the action 
with all the attention one must devote to witnessing a crime or a secret act. But 
he observed a fictional event, a creation of himself. By remaining on stage and 
assisting the course of events he conceived and organized, Kantor revealed to us 
that beyond the visible surface of the performance, there was nothing, or perhaps 
there was only Kantor in person, the master of the ghosts on stage. The 
characters were only images in his mind, fragments of his memory. We could 
see him and the images inside him, but they were nothing more than the images 
of an old man and several actors. Life existed elsewhere. The witness is always 
a solitary figure. By watching Kantor, we were witnessing, rather than 
penetrating, the appearance of his memory. The representation of memory is not 
memory, but a new fact, affected by the weakness and perversion of memory and 
not by its authenticity. To witness is to betray. Presented to others, inferiority 
becomes exteriority and necessarily false. But the artist must witness. The artist 
is obliged to betray. Expression is desired because it is the means towards 
exteriority. The stage is the site of this necessary betrayal. 
The same effect, that is, the exhibition of metaphysical inconsistency and 
the personal desire for representation, was also achieved in Kantor's theatre with 
the help of, for example, mannequins, machines, objects, one-dimensional 
scenery, cadaverous make-up of the actors, the repetitive structure of the 
performance, and stereotypical characters. It is not possible to discuss all these 
devices here. What is important to note is that all these devices work against the 
referential illusion embodied on stage. 
n i . 
These qualities were generally observed by Kantor's audience and were 
often described as an "oneric" or "surrealistic" style. I believe, however, that one 
cannot understand Kantor in terms of "style." What is fundamental here is not 
an aesthetic choice, but an ontological one. The aim of Kantor's performance 
was more ambitious than mere decorative effect. Kantor attempted to show his 
mode of perception of reality as a mnestic surface. In the Western tradition of 
art, the theatrical fiction was always thought of as "an imitation of action and of 
life."6 The life and the action imitated are not real, but it seems important to 
think about them as if they were. This means that every representation had to be 
constructed in such a way that a possible world corresponded to it. Antigone, 
Hamlet, and even Waiting for Godot each correspond to a possible world. The 
plays provide an account of what happens in these worlds. A world must be a 
248 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
consistent place, where people exist with definite identities, where one can find 
objects, towns, and gods more or less similar to our own. 
Aristotle says that in the "possible world" of a drama, there must be "an 
action that is complete, and whole, and of a certain magnitude; for there may be 
a whole that is wanting in magnitude. A whole is that which has a beginning, 
a middle, and an end. A beginning is that which does not itself follow anything 
by causal necessity, but after which something naturally is or comes to be. An 
end, on the contrary, is that which itself naturally follows some other thing, either 
by necessity, or as a rule, but has nothing following it. A middle is that which 
follows something as some other thing follows it.7 
The Aristotelian description is very broad and applies more or less to all 
European theatre, including the most "experimental" dramas such as the works 
of the Living Theatre, Beckett, Pinter, and Ionesco. In most of Kantor's 
productions, however, the action "imitated" had neither a beginning nor an end, 
because what was "imitated" could not be considered an action in the Aristotelian 
sense. What began and ended in Kantor's work was not the "imitation of an 
action" but the "action of imitation." Furthermore, Kantor's productions did not 
construct a "possible world" in the strictest sense of the term. Objects and 
characters in his works were not stable, consistent, autonomous, or definite. No 
site corresponds to this in a production. "Wielopole" was not a possible world, 
because it lacked the metaphysical qualities for it. 
Kantor was well aware of this peculiarity. Thus, he would not refer to his 
productions as "representations." Instead, he preferred an obscure term, the 
French phrase séance dramatic, which means "dramatic session." A session, in 
the language of politics, law, and business signifies a time of work. The word 
"drama" derives from the Greek verb "draomai," meaning "to do" or "to act." A 
similar reference to action may be found in the word "fiction," which comes from 
the Latin verb "fingere," an intensive form of "facere" or "to do." 
I do not refer to these etymological roots for their reference to Antiquity. 
I do believe that Kantor worked to establish a different root for theatre, not an 
imitation or a reproduction of a possible world, but an act of memory, able to 
summon the personal images of the artist and to present them to the audience. 
But the summoning and the production were not intended to recreate this memory 
as a reality. On the contrary, they are images, or more precisely, dead and fragile 
ghosts. This is the nature of memory, and perhaps it is also the nature of the 
appearance as a whole. 
We are accustomed to think of exteriority as seduction in the mode of 
fashion, television, and advertising. With Baudrillard and Lyotard we learned to 
imagine the exteriority of the world as a seductive surface, which captures us in 
a fake world of simulacrum. Although this may be true, exteriority is also what 
betrays us by placing us outside, leaving our traces in the world, and reducing us 
to insignificant stereotypical expressions. Kantor dared speak to us about the 
dangers of exteriority at the very moment he defended his memory and 
constructed the significance of his images. He was capable of understanding his 
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inferiority as exteriority and revealing this to us. For this reason, his theatre was 
not simply innovative, but also great. 
Notes 
1. S. Ill, Sez. Ill, Cap. 3, III, 1. (my translation) 
2. This quotation and those that follow come from a lecture given by Michel Foucault at the 
Collège de France in 1983. It was published in the Magazine littéraire 207 (May 1984). (my 
translation) 
3. Hegel, loc. cit. 
4. I allude here to the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation: the "real presence" of God is 
believed to be present in the Eucharist. See George Steiner, Real Presences (1989). 
5. Cfr: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus. 
6. Aristotle, Peri poietikès, 50 a 20. 
7. Ibid., 50 b 35. See also Bernard F. Dukore, Dramatic Theory and Criticism (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974) 38. 
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